Sensible and Intelligible Worlds in Leibniz and Kant

  • Catherine Wilson
Chapter
Part of the The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science book series (WONS, volume 43)

Abstract

Kant is generally held to have demonstrated the false pretence of a system constructed on the order of Leibniz’s Monadology to describe a supersensible or “intelligible” reality. The Critique is thus conceived as superseding all previous philosophical systems, which are thereby revealed as “dogmatic” or based on wishful thinking. This is certainly the way Kant portrays himself in works dealing with the subject of progress in metaphysics. However, when faced with what he regarded as the corruptions of the contemporary Leibnizians, Kant could also depict himself as the true defender of Leibniz and his own critical work as the key to the correct understanding of the systems of the past. Clearly, then, the relation of Monadology to Critique is not simply the relation of a conjecture to its refutation. The present essay examines some aspects of Kant’s own fascination with the idea of the supersensible, arguing that the Critique is an attempt to unmake and then remake the notion in more serviceable form. The relation between the Leibnizian and the Kantian phenomenalisms is discussed in the main body of the paper.

Keywords

Pure Reason Sceptical Hypothesis Pure Concept Moral Impulse False Pretence 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. 1.
    Kant, Immanuel, Dreams of a Spirit Seer (1765), tr. J. Manolesco (New York: Vantage, 1969).Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Kant, Immanuel, ‘Inaugural dissertation’, in Kant: Selected Pre-Critical Writings, tr. and ed. G. B. Kerferd and D. E. Walford (Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press, 1968).Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Kant, Immanuel, ‘Letter to M. Herz’, in Philosophical Correspondence, 1759– 1799, tr. and ed. A. Zweig (Chicago: Chicago Univ. Press, 1967).Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, tr. N. Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929).Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Kant, Immanuel, ‘On a discovery according to which any new critique of pure reason has been made superfluous by an earlier one’ (1790), inThe Kant- Eberhard Controversy, ed. H. E. Allison (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1973).Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Kant, Immanuel, What Real Progress has Metaphysics made in Germany since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff? (1793–1802?), tr. and ed. T. Humphrey (New York: Abaris, 1983).Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Leibniz, G. W., Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters, ed. L. E. Loemker (2nd ed., Dordrecht: Reidel, 1969).Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Leibniz, G. W., New Essays (1765), tr. P. Remnant and J. Bennett (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1981).Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    Nietzsche, F., Twilight of the Idols, tr. R. J. Hollingdale (Middlesex: Penguin, 1968).Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    Paton, H. J., ‘Kant on the errors of Leibniz’, in Kant Studies Today, ed. L. W. Beck (La Salle IL: Open Court, 1969).Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    Plotinus, Enneads, 6 vols, tr. A. H. Armstrong (London and Cambridge MA: Heinemann, 1965).Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    Swedenborg, Emmanuel, Soul-Body Interaction (1769), in Emmanuel Swedenborg: The Universal Human and Soul-Body Interaction, tr. and ed. G. F. Dole (New York: Paulist, 1984).Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1988

Authors and Affiliations

  • Catherine Wilson

There are no affiliations available

Personalised recommendations