Pramāṇasamuccaya II: “On reasoning”

Chapter 6. Pramāṇasamuccaya II: “On reasoning”

1. 1.
   The quotation is from Vaiśeṣika Sūtra 2.1.10: “Na ca dṛṣtānāṁ sparśa ity adṛṣṭaliṅgo vāyuḥ. (And since [its] touch is not that of things that are seen, wind has a sign that is unseen.)” Candrānanda (Kaṇāda 1961 ed., p. 12) says: “Yadi khalv ayaṁ kṣityādisparśo’bhaviṣyad gandharasarūpaiḥ sahopalabhemahi, na caivaṁ, tasmāt pṛthivyādivyatiriktasya vāyor liṇgam. (If in fact this [wind]) had the touch that earth and other [elements] have, then we would apprehend it with its smell, taste and visible properties. But it is not like that, and therefore wind, which is distinct from earth and so forth, has a sign [by which it is known].” See also Udayana’s Kiraṇāvali on this passage in Praśastapada 1971 ed., pp. 56–57.Google Scholar
2. 2.
   The phrase “confirmed by a process of elimination” is a translation of the Tibetan phrase “yongs su lhag pas grub pa” that appears in Kanakavarman’s translation or “kun gyi rjes thogs” that appears in Vasudhararaksita’s. Kanakavarman’s Tibetan phrase could tentatively be retranslated into Sanskrit as “pariśeṣeṇa (or pariśeṣyāt) siddha,” but the rendering by Vasudhararakṣita is more resistant to understanding.Google Scholar
3. 3.
   My translation of this passage in an earlier publication (Hayes 1980:249–250) was quite different from this. The basic issue of this passage was badly distorted in that translation because of my labouring under a fundamental misconception about the Vaiśeṣika system of thought. In that earlier translation I made the very serious blunder of reporting that the quality touch was said by the Vaiśeṣikas to inhere in only one substance, wind. But I have learned since then that the real issue here is that the Vaiśeṣikas taught that the touch that inheres in wind is distinct from the kind of touch that occurs generally in the other elements. A good overview of the Vaiśeṣika system, incidentally, is provided in both Matilal 1977 and Potter 1977 ed., pp. 212–220.Google Scholar
4. 4.
   For the history of this idea in the literature of the Sanskrit grammarians see Brough 1951 and 1953.Google Scholar
5. 5.
   Randle (1926:17) cites the Sanskrit for the first line of this verse, and the second line is quoted by Uddyotakara in Gautama 1967 ed., p. 301. The whole verse reads: āptavākyāvisaṁvādasāmānyād anumānatā anumāne’tha tattulye sadbhāvo nāstitāsati.’Google Scholar
6. 6.
   Kitagawa (1965:93) follows Vasudhararakṣita’s syntax here, which places phyogs and gtso bo as two things whose natures are denied as objects of inference. Kitagawa translates “phyogs” as standing for Sanskrit “diś” meaning direction. But Jinendrabuddhi (P105a⁸) supports Kanakavarman’s translation, which makes, I think, much better sense. In this interpretation “phyogs” should be taken as being the translation of the original Sanskrit “pakṣa” in the sense of hypothesis.Google Scholar
7. 7.
   For these first sentences I have followed the Tibetan translation of Vasudhararakṣita (D29a⁴), because the translation by Kanakavarman (Pilla⁶) appears to be faulty here. It is not formed of grammatically complete sentences and seems to be lacking at least one crucial phrase. It reads: “rjes su dpag pa ni chos khyad par can gyi chos can yin tel de la dus phyis chos kyi spyi’i tshul gyis mngon sum mam rjes su dpag pas mthong ba’ol lde’i rigs la yang mtha’ dag gam phyogs gcig yod pa nyid dol I (Inference (sic) is a property-bearer qualified by a property. Later one observes, either through sensation or inference, a property there in its general form. Presence wholly or partially also in that universal.)”Google Scholar
8. 8.
   The material supplied in square brackets in the translation is taken from the commentary of Jinendrabuddhi (P108b³), who expands the verse to read “ji ltar rtags kyi yul can gyi shes pa,” which could be retranslated into Sanskrit as “liṇgaviṣayaṁ jñānam.”Google Scholar
9. 9.
   I have followed the translation of Vasudhararakṣita for this clause.Google Scholar
10. 10.
    The term “psychologism” is used in a variety of ways, but I am using it to refer to the issue of whether questions of logic, aesthetics and epistemology can or should be reduced to a study of the way that human beings in fact think or ought to think. Haack (1978:238–242) has a good discussion of this issue. Haack herself seems to favour a kind of what she calls a “nominalist version of weak psychologism,” according to which logic is normative and prescribes how we should think and is therefore psychologists but is a weaker form of psychologism than the view that logic describes how we in fact think. What is nominalistic about Haack’s interpretation of weak psychologism is that she prefers to think of reasoning and believing as a complicated relationship between a person and sentences rather than as a relationship between a person and independently existing relations among propositions. Since the issue of psychologism has been important during the past two centuries of European-based philosophy some discussion of this issue is bound to play a role in the comparison of Indian and European systems of logic and epistemology, I do not at this point feel quite prepared to go deeply into that issue, but perhaps it will be the subject of a future study.Google Scholar
11. 11.
    The original Sanskrit for this verse has been discovered by Chatterji (1929–30): kṛtakatvād dhvanir nityo mūrttatvād aprameyataḥ amūrtaśrāvaṇatvābhyām anityaś” cākṣuṣatvataḥ.Google Scholar
12. 12.
    The Sanskrit originals for the next four verses are quoted from Vācaspatimiśra’s Tātparyaṭīkā in Gautama 1967 ed., p. 320. They are also cited and discussed by Vidvābhūṣaṇa 1921:281–282, Randle 1926:18 and Matilal 1968. Matilal also provides information on how the verses were discussed by Vācaspatimiśra and later Naiyāyika commentators, and on the basis of this information suggests alterations in Randle’s tentative translations. The Sanskrit for these verses reads: kecid dharmāntaraṁ meyaṁ liṇgasyāvyabhicārataḥ sambandhaṁ kecid icchanti siddhatvād dharmadharmiṇoḥ liṇgaṁ dharme prasiddhaṁ cet kim anyat tena mīyate atha dharmiṇi tasyaiva kimartha nānumeyatā sambandhe’pi dvayaṁ nāsti ṣaṣṭhī śruyeta tadvati avācyo’nugṛhītatvān na cāsau liṇgasaṁgataḥ liṇgasyāvyabhicāras tu dharmeṇānyatra diśyate tatra prasiddhaṁ tadyuktam dharmiṇaṁ gamayiṣyati. Some quotations of verse eleven read “dṛśyate” for “diśyate,” but the Tibetan translations all support the latter reading, using various forms of the root “ston,” meaning to teach or to show.Google Scholar
13. 13.
    In translating this passage I have followed the Tibetan of Vasudhararakṣita rather than that of Kanakavarman.Google Scholar
14. 14.
    This passage is rather obscure in both Kanakavarman and Vasudhararakṣita, so I have had to rely entirely on Jinendrabuddhi (P114b⁶). The passages under discussion read as follows. K113b¹: “gnyis nyid la sogs pa du ma dangl thun mong ba rnams kyi rten ma bzung bar’d’zin pa ni mthong ngol gang dag’dra ba phyir smra ba’i ‘dra ba’ang ma yin nol” V32a⁴: “du ma rnams las gnyis nyid la sogs pa’i thun mong ba ni yod pa ma yin nol gang dag spyi mthog zhing gzung pa po yang rten ma gzung pa po dang mtshungs shing ‘dra bar ‘gyur rol”Google Scholar
15. 15.
    The Sanskrit original for this verse has been discovered by Katsura: sambandho yadyapi dviṣṭaḥ sahabhūliṇgaliṇginoḥ ādhārādheyavad vṛttis tasya saṁyogivan na tu.Google Scholar