The Elemental Passions of the Soul Poetics of the Elements in the Human Condition: Part 3 pp 145-163 | Cite as
Descartes and Hobbes on the Passions
Abstract
René Descartes (1596–1650) and Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) were contemporaries who met briefly but not amicably, who engaged in an acerbic published debate on issues raised by Descartes’ Meditations, and who were openly critical of one another’s fundamental premises. Descartes said of Hobbes’ moral philosophy in De Cive that it was very dangerous, because it supposed all human beings to be wicked, and thus gave them occasion to be so.1 Hobbes retorted that Descartes might well be the best geometer in the world, but that he had no knack for philosophy.2 Leo Strauss nevertheless calls attention to their common disdain for the unscientific and impractical character of the ancient treatises on morality, and even observes that “... Hobbes’ own system of morals corresponds better to Descartes’ deepest intention than does the morality of Les passions de l’âme.”3 In the same spirit, Richard Kennington claims that Descartes shared with Hobbes the modern conviction that reason serves the passions, and that what distinguishes humans from animals is the more malleable instrumentality of human reason, rather than some specifically different end.4 On this interpretation, we ought to construe Descartes’ treatise on the passions in the light of his fundamental project, i.e., to develop a universal method designed to promote the mastery of nature.
Keywords
Pineal Gland Inertial Motion Animal Spirit English Work Intellectual HumilityPreview
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Notes
- 1.John Campbell, “The Author’s Life”, in The Moral and Political Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury (London, 1750), xiv.Google Scholar
- 1a.See Arnold A Rogow, Thomas Hobbes: Radical in the Service of Reaction (New York: Norton, 1986), p. 148 n.Google Scholar
- 2.He [Hobbes] would say that “had he [Descartes] kept himself to geometry he had been the best geometer in the world but that his head did not lye for philosophy”. John Aubrey, Brief Lives, Chiefly of Contemporaries, Set Down by John Aubrey, between the Years 1669 and 1696. Ed. Andrew Clark. 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1898), p. 161. See Rogow, Thomas Hobbes, p. 148.Google Scholar
- 3.Leo Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Genesis (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936), p. 56 and p. 88 n. 1.Google Scholar
- 4.Richard Kennington, “René Descartes”, in Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, eds., History of Political Philosophy. 2nd edition (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1972), p. 407.Google Scholar
- 5.René Descartes, Oeuvres et Lettres, ed. A. Bridoux (Paris: Gallimard, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 1953), p. 168 and p. 722. The translations are mine. Unless otherwise indicated, translations will be taken from The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1985). Subsequent reference to Les passions de l’âme will be confined to an indication within the text of this essay of the relevant chapters (which are brief, and, of course, common both to the French and English editions). See also Kennington, “René Descartes”, p. 402 and p. 410.Google Scholar
- 6.Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, or the Matter, Form, and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil. The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, Vol. III, ed. William Molesworth (Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1966), ch. vi. Subsequent references to Leviathan will be limited to references within the text of this essay to the relevant chapters.Google Scholar
- 7.Aristotle, Physics, 3, 1, 200b.Google Scholar
- 8.Ibid., 3, 1, 224b.Google Scholar
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- 16.Paul Ricoeur, Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary, trans. Erazim Kohak (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press), pp. 20–4. See Les Passions de l’âme, xvii.Google Scholar
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- 18.Descartes also adds the following: “... c’est en usant seulement de la vie et des conversations ordinaires, et en s’abstenant de méditer et d’étudier aux choses qui exercent l’imagination, qu’on apprend à concevoir l’union de l’âme et le corps”. Oeuvres et Lettres, p. 1158.Google Scholar
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- 22.Biaise Pascal, Pensées, ed. Louis Lafuma (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1962), #199 (72), p. 116.Google Scholar
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- 26.Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press, 1985), p. 60.Google Scholar
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- 30.Ibid., p. 291–2.Google Scholar
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