Experiment and meaning

  • David Gooding
Chapter
Part of the Science and Philosophy book series (SCPH, volume 5)

Abstract

It is easy to dismiss this as a chicken-and-egg question. As construed by received philosophies of science, as requiring a definitive and general answer, it seems irrelevant. Theorizing is often the continuation of experiment by other means (pace Popper and van Frassen). Hacking has shown that different episodes in the history of science show different answers to the question of the priority of theory and experiment.1 In earlier chapters I showed how phenomena are created: first construed, then interpreted and integrated into arguments. The bias towards the literary or theoretician’s view of experiment means there are few philosophical studies of how phenomena are made into centrepieces of theory. In this chapter I show how a significant innovation in the physical understanding of force — Faraday’s concept of a field of action defined in terms of properties of systems of lines of force — emerged from the attempt to integrate electrostatics and new discoveries in magnetism made during the 1840s.

Keywords

Magnetic Force Magnetic Effect Experimental Practice Ponderomotive Force Magnetic Line 
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Notes

  1. 2.
    Lakatos addressed his question directly to Hume’s injunction: see Lakatos (1980a), p. 2.Google Scholar
  2. 3.
    For analogies to technological invention see Gooding (1990a) and Carlson and Gorman (1990).Google Scholar
  3. 4.
    See Kitcher (1988).Google Scholar
  4. 5.
    See Hesse (1961), Heiman (1970), Doran (1975). Accounts that highlight results emphasized in textbook accounts of Maxwell’s theory are Kline (1985) and Owen (1971).Google Scholar
  5. 6.
    On electrostatic and magnetic results see Whittaker (1951) and for the impact of the Faraday-effect see Knudsen (1976).Google Scholar
  6. 7.
    Studies emphasizing metaphysical and theoretical sources of experimental problems are Hesse(1961), Williams (1965) and Agassi (1971).Google Scholar
  7. 8.
    See Faraday (1844 and 1846).Google Scholar
  8. 9.
    For other criteria of the meaning of field concepts see Nersessian (1985). Faraday insisted that his principle of contiguous action did not forbid action across sensible distances (see Gooding, 1978) but this only postponed the problem of deciding whether empty space can transmit inductive action: see section 10.8.Google Scholar
  9. 10.
    See, for example, Drake (1978) on Galileo.Google Scholar
  10. 11.
    Thomson (1870) in Thomson (1872), at p. 575.Google Scholar
  11. 12.
    Thomson refers to a statement published in 1846 (see Researches., vol. 3, para. 2805 and the Diary, vol. 4, para. 8109 ff. and 8127–44). He discussed Faraday’s results in Thomson (1847 and 1850).Google Scholar
  12. 13.
    See Thomson (1845, 1846).Google Scholar
  13. 14.
    See Thomson (1850), reprinted in Thomson (1872), at pp. 502–4, Thomson’s italics.Google Scholar
  14. 15.
    This must have a general mathematical description compatible with the principles governing all dynamical descriptions. Both Thomson and Maxwell developed dynamical models for the electromagnetic aether. Thomson’s willingness to accept Faraday’s new description increased when it became clear that fields are entities obeying higher-order principles such as conservation. Thomson himself contributed to this demonstration: see Wise (1979a) and Smith and Wise (1989).Google Scholar
  15. 16.
    Faraday defined the term as “any portion of space traversed by lines of magnetic power”, commenting that “there is probably no space without them”, Faraday (1839–55), v. 3, para. 2805. Thomson’s first definition of the term ‘magnetic field’ reverses the priority. In 1851 he defined ‘field’ in terms of points: “Any space at every point of which there is a finite magnetic force is called ‘a field of magnetic force’, or, magnetic being understood simply ‘a field of force’ …”.He then defined lines as lines drawn ‘through a magnetic field in the direction of the force at each point through which it passes’, Thomson (1851), reprinted in Thomson (1872), at p. 467.Google Scholar
  16. 17.
    See the Diary., vol. 4, paras. 7979, 8014, 8085, 8108, 8180. He first used the term ‘field’ in the Researches at para. 2247. Faraday’s first theoretical definition appeared in 1850 at ibid., paras. 2805–6.Google Scholar
  17. 18.
    For Thomson’s dissemination see: Thomson (1850, 1851) in Thomson (1872), pp. 467 and 486.Google Scholar
  18. 19.
    For Herschel see Gooding (1985b). Faraday described some of his earlier attempts during the 1830s in the Faraday (1839–55), vol. 1, paras. 951–55, 1252–1306, 1688–98.Google Scholar
  19. 20.
    For a description and diagrams see Gooding (1981), pp. 234–35.Google Scholar
  20. 21.
    See Thomson (1856) and for other examples, Knudsen (1976).Google Scholar
  21. 22.
    Faraday’s experimental use of light is described in James (1985).Google Scholar
  22. 23.
    See Diary., vol. 4, paras. 7874 ff., where Faraday describes a new and more powerful magnet. For several days he got no results at all.Google Scholar
  23. 24.
    Ibid., paras. 7902 ff.Google Scholar
  24. 25.
    Further differentiation between dia-, para-and ferro-magnetics came between 1847 and 1850: see Gooding (1975, 1981).Google Scholar
  25. 26.
    See Kuhn (1962a).Google Scholar
  26. 27.
    See the Diary, vol. 4, paras. 8115–21 and Gooding (1982a), p. 52–55.Google Scholar
  27. 28.
    Kuhn loc. cit. note 26 and Feyerabend (1975), chs 6–9.Google Scholar
  28. 29.
    See Gooding (1980a) for an exposition of these principles.Google Scholar
  29. 30.
    See Gooding (1980b, 1882b).Google Scholar
  30. 31.
    Cf. Diary, vol. 4, paras. 8118–28, for 10 November 1845.Google Scholar
  31. 32.
    J. Plücker to Faraday, 3 November 1847, in Williams et al., eds. (1971), v. 1, p. 511; Diary, vol. 5, paras 9415–31. For Plucker’s work see Gooding (1981).Google Scholar
  32. 33.
    Faraday to Whewell, 7 November 1848, in Williams et al., eds. (1971), vol. 1, pp. 528–29.Google Scholar
  33. 34.
    For Faraday’s theology of nature see Levere (1971).Google Scholar
  34. 35.
    See Gooding (1982a) and for aspects of the cultural context, Cannon (1978) and Smith and Wise (1989).Google Scholar
  35. 36.
    See Thomson (1847, 1850).Google Scholar
  36. 37.
    Thomson (1842) and Smith and Wise (1989).Google Scholar
  37. 38.
    For references see Gooding (1980b, 1981) and Thomson (1850), in Thomson (1872).Google Scholar
  38. 39.
    Faraday (1851a, 1851b),(1852), Researches, paras. 3070–3299, and Faraday (1855), ibid., paras. 3300–3362.Google Scholar
  39. 40.
    Faraday (1847), p. 476 ff. and (1850).Google Scholar
  40. 41.
    The experiments are described in Gooding (1981), p. 249 ff.Google Scholar
  41. 42.
    Diary, v. 4, paras. 8398, 8455–8639 and Researches, vol. 3, para. 2399. Thomson’s first treatment of Faraday’s law corresponded to the two-list interpretation because the coefficient of magnetic susceptibility is positive and near unity for ferromagnetics, positive for paramagnetics, and negative for diamagnetics; Thomson (1847), p. 499.Google Scholar
  42. 43.
    Researches., vol. 3, paras. 2721–22, 2730–50.Google Scholar
  43. 44.
    See Gooding (1981), pp. 266–68.Google Scholar
  44. 45.
    Researches, vol. 3, para. 2807.Google Scholar
  45. 46.
    Faraday argued that “mere motion would not generate a [physical] relation” in (1851), at paras. 3171 ff.; see also (1852) and (1855), paras. 3336–40.Google Scholar
  46. 47.
    See the papers cited in notes 39 and 46.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1990

Authors and Affiliations

  • David Gooding
    • 1
  1. 1.University of BathEngland

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