Belief Revision, Non-Monotonic Reasoning, and the Ramsey Test

  • Charles Cross
Part of the Studies in Cognitive Systems book series (COGS, volume 5)

Abstract

In [Gärdenfors86] Peter Gärdenfors proves that two interesting principles about belief revision — the Ramsey rule and the Preservation principle — cannot both be true given certain arguably innocuous background assumptions about the logic of rational belief change. The two principles can be formulated roughly as follows: the Ramsey rule states that the indicative conditional propositions that an agent believes record that agent’s dispositions to revise beliefs in light of new information; the Preservation Principle states that an agent should not give up old beliefs when revising his or her beliefs to accommodate new information unless the new information contradicts the old beliefs. Faced with a choice between these principles, Gärdenfors tentatively argues for giving up the Ramsey rule.

Keywords

Belief Revision Belief State Basic Belief Belief Change Initial Belief 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1990

Authors and Affiliations

  • Charles Cross

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