An Approach to General Proof Theory and a Conjecture of a Kind of Completeness of Intuitionistic Logic Revisited

Chapter
Part of the Trends in Logic book series (TREN, volume 39)

Abstract

Thirty years ago I formulated a conjecture about a kind of completeness of intuitionistic logic. The framework in which the conjecture was formulated had the form of a semantic approach to a general proof theory (presented at the 4th World Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science at Bucharest 1971 [6]). In the present chapter, I shall reconsider this 30-year old conjecture, which still remains unsettled, but which I continue to think of as a plausible and important supposition. Reconsidering the conjecture, I shall also reconsider and revise the semantic approach in which the conjecture was formulated.

Keywords

Inference Rule Predicate Logic Intuitionistic Logic Natural Deduction Logical Constant 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgments

Work on this chapter was done within the project Interpretation and Meaning, funded by Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.StockholmSweden

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