Economic Principles in Antitrust Law in the Aftermath of the More Economic Approach

General Aspects, Current Issues and Recent Developments
Chapter
Part of the Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship book series (EALELS, volume 1)

Abstract

More than a decade after progressive discussions of economic tendencies in traditional antitrust law1 and an increasing importance of economics in antitrust assessments in Europe2, the relationship between economics and law in the assessment of antitrust cases has still not yet adequately been solved. Although a “more economic approach ” has been discussed widely by economists and lawyers over the past years in the EU, in the EU3 member states4 as well as in Switzerland,5 there are still some important issues which are not yet solved.6

The key questions are, whether a form-based legal approach should be followed, whether an effects-based economic approach is better suited to cover antitrust cases, or whether an approach that combines both approaches is possible, at least in some cases.

Keywords

Economic Approach Competition Authority Legal Certainty Dominant Firm Antitrust Authority 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Attorneys at LawSeitz & RiemerLoerrachGermany

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