Ancient Theories of Judgement

Chapter
Part of the Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind book series (SHPM, volume 12)

Abstract

The Greek term logos stands for a statement which is expressed in a language, but it also refers to a corresponding judgement or belief (doxa, hypolepsis) in one’s soul when one makes such a statement. The connexion between statements and judgements is arguably close, and some of the problems which arose in connection with statements were also relevant to judgement. A major problem discussed by early Greek thinkers concerned the nature and possibility of false statements: what, if anything, is making a false statement?

Keywords

Sense Perception Simple Object False Statement Rational Appearance Simple Understanding 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of HelsinkiHelsinkiFinland

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