How Where We Stand Constrains Where I Stand: Applying Bratman’s Account of Self-Governance to Collective Action

  • Joseph Kisolo-SsonkoEmail author
Part of the Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality book series (SIPS, volume 2)


Certain theories of collective action claim that collective intentions can have a direct normative power over individuals. This chapter seeks to make sense of the relationship between this and the assumed autonomy of individual agents. It is argued that a modified version of Michael Bratman’s “self-governance” account of the normative force of individual intentions can be applied to collective intentions. Doing this gives a distinct way to understand the normative interplay between the individual and the collective. It changes the way we must see the universality of the normative force of collective intentions and it emphasises the importance of the individual’s agentive identity being entangled with the agentive identity of the collective.


Action Theory Collectives Collective Action Collective Intentionality 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophySheffield UniversitySheffieldUK

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