Coherence and Probability: A Probabilistic Account of Coherence

Chapter
Part of the Law and Philosophy Library book series (LAPS, volume 107)

Abstract

I develop a probabilistic account of coherence, and argue that at least in certain respects it is preferable to (at least some of) the main extant probabilistic accounts of coherence: (i) Igor Douven and Wouter Meijs’s account, (ii) Branden Fitelson’s account, (iii) Erik Olsson’s account, and (iv) Tomoji Shogenji’s account. Further, I relate the account to an important, but little discussed, problem for standard varieties of coherentism, viz., the “Problem of Justified Inconsistent Beliefs.”

Keywords

Belief System Adequate Account Perceptual Belief Great Coherence Probabilistic Account 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgments

I wish to thank Michał Araszkiewicz, Kyle Kloster, Michael Roche, Eric Senseman, and the participants in the Artificial Intelligence, Coherence and Judicial Reasoning Workshop at ICAIL 2011 (the 13th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law) for helpful comments on or discussion of ancestors of this paper. Further, I wish to thank Igor Douven, Kyle Kloster, and Eric Senseman for helpful correspondence on some of the issues discussed in the paper and related issues.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht. 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyTexas Christian UniversityFort WorthUSA

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