Pautz refutes tracking intentionalism. We defend it. In what follows we will attempt to undermine the motivation for some of what he says and discuss one of his arguments in more detail. We don’t, however, defend tracking intentionalism because we believe it to be true. There are parts of it we do find plausible (intentionalism with external world content). We defend it, though, because we believe some of Pautz’s criticisms raise interesting questions about how to think about perception that are independent of the truth or falsity of tracking intentionalism.
KeywordsInternal State Neural Response Phenomenal Character External Property Phenomenal Experience
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