Positive Rights and Globalization of Duties

Chapter

Abstract

Positive rights prescribe that there should be something with certain features (food, dwelling, health care, education, etc.). Consequently, positive rights—contrary to negative or liberal ones—require actions and not simply omissions. Positive rights demand goods from other individuals, the State or the international community. In this case, not doing anything may prevent someone from having the goods to which he or she has a right; for example, if hunger exists and there is no global distribution of food; or if there is a lack of housing and this does not elicit an adequate housing policy. So, paraphrasing Dworkin’s famous Taking Rights Seriously, I intend to establish the consequences and scope that the recognition of positive rights entails; that is, Taking Positive Rights Seriously. Specifically, I analyse the case of social and economic rights in the European Union Draft Treaty.

Keywords

Existential Quantifier Legitimate Claim Collective Entity Human Rights Internal Legal System 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)MadridSpain

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