Norms in Game Theory

  • Davide Grossi
  • Luca Tummolini
  • Paolo Turrini
Part of the Law, Governance and Technology Series book series (LGTS, volume 8)


This chapter summarizes two main views on norms and games as emerging in literature on game theory, social science, philosophy and artificial intelligence. The first view originates in the field of mechanism design or implementation theory and characterizes norms as mechanisms enforcing desirable social properties in classes of games. According to the second view, originating from work in the social sciences and evolutionary game theory, norms are studied via the notion of equilibrium and are viewed as emergent social contracts or conventions.


Nash Equilibrium Game Form Coordination Game Evolutionary Game Theory Correlate Equilibrium 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht. 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of LiverpoolLiverpoolUK
  2. 2.Institute of Cognitive Science and Technologies, CNRRomeItaly
  3. 3.University of LuxembourgLuxembourg CityLuxembourg

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