Identity and Equality in Sexual Difference

Abstract

The chapter analyses the arguments and reasons for sexual naturalism, which recognises sex as a natural phenomenon, and for sexual dimorphism, which states that the sexes are two in nature and that they can only be two. The philosophical arguments go through the non-malleability of gender, the constitutive sexual identity and the reasons for complementarity, moving from the de-construction of gender to a possible philosophical and philosophical-juridical re-construction of the relevance of nature in sexual identity and of sexual difference in the family relationship. The goal is to demonstrate the dangers of an in-different or neutral law, the contradictions and ambiguities that arise behind the appeals to equality and non-discrimination as ‘equivalence’, in order to comprehend and justify the sense of justice (as treating equals equally and the unequal unequally) and the fundamental human rights of the person before the gender claims.