Getting Over Gettier

Chapter
Part of the Studies in History and Philosophy of Science book series (AUST, volume 28)

Abstract

For centuries tradition had it that knowledge is justified true belief. Then Edmund Gettier produced cases that refute that traditional view – or so most philosophers think. I disagree. The widespread intuition lying behind the so-called ‘Gettier Cases’ is that there is epistemic bad luck (we can unluckily fail to know), but no epistemic good luck (we cannot luckily know). I reject this puritanical intuition. I also question the externalist or reliabilist views of knowledge and/or justification that the Gettier Cases have spawned.

Keywords

True Belief Reliable Process Perceptual Belief Good Luck Gettier Case 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

References

  1. Cheyne, C. 2001. Knowledge, cause, and abstract objects: Causal objections to platonism. Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.Google Scholar
  2. Gettier, E. 1963. Is justified true belief knowledge? Analysis 23: 121–3.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of OtagoDunedinNew Zealand

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