Scientific Realism and Historical Evidence: Shortcomings of the Current State of Debate

  • Juha Saatsi
Conference paper
Part of the The European Philosophy of Science Association Proceedings book series (EPSP, volume 1)


This chapter discusses three shortcomings of the current state of the debate regarding historical evidence against scientific realism. Attending to these issues will direct the debate away from over-generalising wholesale arguments.


Historical Evidence Scientific Realism Predictive Success Realism Debate Pessimistic Induction 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.



I wish to thank Steven French and Angelo Cei for helpful correspondence.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of LeedsLeedsUK

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