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Type-Theoretical Dynamics

Exploring Belief Revision in a Constructive Framework
  • Giuseppe PrimieroEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science book series (LEUS, volume 23)

Abstract

In the present paper a dynamics for type theory is introduced. The formalization provides epistemic explanations for the basic notions of belief state and belief set by referring to assertion conditions for type-theoretical judgements; it interprets expectations in terms of default assumptions for such a structure and it adapts the usual revision operations and the analogous of the Ramsey test. The model, restricted to operations of revision, merging and information preference, provides a constructive type-theoretical approach to epistemic dynamics.

Keywords

Type Theory Belief Revision Belief State Propositional Content Knowledge State 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgements

A first draft of this paper was written during a Research Fellowship at the University of Leiden (The Netherlands) in 2006. Thanks to Göran Sundholm and Maria van der Schaar for discussions related to various topics connected to this research. Later versions and this final form were drafted as a Postdoctoral Fellow at Ghent University (Belgium). Thanks to two referees for precious comments.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.FWO, Ghent UniversityGhentBelgium
  2. 2.IEG, Oxford UniversityOxfordUK

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