The Idea of a Material Value-Ethics

Chapter
Part of the Phaenomenologica book series (PHAE, volume 203)

Abstract

The key concepts that define material value-ethics – “material,” “value” and “ethics” as the term will be understood in this treatise – are identified. Material value-ethics is phenomenological in its reliance on the method of eidetic intuition developed by Husserl and others. Its “materials” are the value themselves, revealed in acts of eidetic feeling; its ethics is founded in the structured value-manifold revealed and corrected and corrected by the phenomenology of values. From this manifold of values may be derived the three “levels” of moral ratiocination: obligation, virtue, and personalism. Scheler’s and Hartmann’s independent research in ethics supplement each other in the establishment of a comprehensive material value-ethics, the recovery and criticism of which is the aim of the work. The significance of their parallel critiques of Kant’s ethics for material value-ethics is evaluated and a program for the recovery and application of material value-ethics is stated.

Keywords

Human Person Intentional Object Moral Consciousness Categorical Imperative Virtue Theory 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Social SciencesNew York Institute of TechnologyNew YorkUSA

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