Self-Evaluation in Intention: Individual and Shared
Intention has long been at the forefront of discussions in the philosophical psychology of intentional action. In spite of its prominence, aspects of it have been neglected. For example, its role in the phenomenology of ability, as discussed by Hans Bernhard Schmidt, Chapter 12, in this volume, is rarely treated. I focus on a different but similarly neglected aspect in this paper. This is the self-evaluative aspect of intention. I argue that in intention the agent takes an evaluative attitude towards herself. This attitude of self-evaluation is best understood in terms of what John Broome has called normative requirements.
KeywordsIntentional Action Shared Activity Normative Requirement Shared Intention Individual Intention
My thanks to the participants at the Workshop on Self-Evaluation at the University of Basel for helpful comments. Thanks to Antti Kauppinen, Federico Lauria and Alain Pé-Curto for very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
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