The Scope and Limits of the No Miracles Argument1

Conference paper
Part of the The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective book series (PSEP, volume 2)

Abstract

In this paper, I review the scope and limits of the no miracles argument. I defend and, where necessary, revise my account of it as a way to justify Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE).

Keywords

Good Explanation Background Theory Empirical Adequacy Abductive Reasoning Deductive Argument 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Dept. of Philosophy and History of ScienceUniversity of AthensAthensGreece

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