Two Conceptions of Openness in Argumentation Theory

Abstract

One of the central values in argumentation theory is that of openness. While this value can be discerned in logical and rhetorical approaches, openness is most prominently featured in the dialectical ideal of a procedure designed to achieve reflective inquiry, critical testing, mutual influence and consensus decision-making. Sometimes this value is embodied in the form of specific rules — such as those in the pragma-dialectical code of conduct (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992), which specify such things as rights to challenge, obligations to answer doubts and objections, and so forth. But usually openness has a more informal quality to it. For example, (1972), (1970), and (1982) all discuss the “bilateral” quality of argumentation and the way this admits to an inherent risk of failure for an arguer, correction by the interlocutor, and calls for the most stringent criticism possible. (1962) ideal of an “Open Society” and (1981) theory of communicative action both assume the possibility of free and mutual critique. In any case, the concept of openness lacks the precision one finds with, say, the concept of inferential validity in logical models of argumentation where we find not only well-defined exemplars of deductively valid forms of inference, but also a relatively clear definition of validity in general. It is perhaps because of this informal quality that argumentation scholars have not always fully appreciated how the value of openness is used in two distinct ways when evaluating the quality of argumentative conduct. In one way, the concept of openness reflects an epistemic orientation. In the other way, the concept of openness takes on a more socio-political orientation.