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The Ordinary Practice of Presuming and Presumption with Special Attention to Veracity and the Burden of Proof

  • Fred J. Kauffeld
Part of the Argumentation Library book series (ARGA, volume 8)

Abstract

This paper offers an analysis of our ordinary concepts of presuming and presumption and of their corresponding everyday practices. Scholars encounter ‘presumption’ in several contexts: the lexicon of the law, as a term of art in studies of argumentation and rhetoric, and occasionally in philosophical discussions. In addition to these technical ideas of presumption, as ordinary persons we share plain senses for these terms, and we commonly engage in practices which can truthfully be reported using ‘presuming’ and ‘presumption’ in their everyday meaning. This essay concerns the commonsense concepts which ordinary language attaches to these terms.

Keywords

Argumentation Theorist Relevant Party Ordinary Concept Ordinary Practice Practical Affair 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Fred J. Kauffeld

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