Non-domination and Dignity

Chapter
Part of the Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy book series (LOET, volume 25)

Abstract

This chapter explores how well the ideal of non-domination succeeds in ensuring the dignity and standing of the individual. It is argued that the way non-domination has been explicated by the leading republican scholar Philip Pettit is problematically ambiguous in two important respects (the precise meaning of ‘avowed or readily avowable interests’; and the question what exactly is involved in ‘being forced to track’ these). After the need to resolve these ambiguities is demonstrated, the chapter argues that non-domination should focus on a person’s moral beliefs rather than on his (avowed) interests. Moreover, it is shown that being non-dominated is not a matter of immunity to interference one regards as wrongful to one’s person, but a matter of such interference not being possible with impunity. This results in a new and more precise, Kantian, reformulation of non-domination. Subsequently, the practical implications of this Kantian reformulation are explored. It is shown that many well-known republican tenets such as the importance of discourse and contestability are also supported by this Kantian reformulation. It is also established, however, that other known republican positions are not tenable. In particular, it is demonstrated that a commitment to non-domination implies a commitment to retributive justice – a result that directly contradicts Pettit’s expressed views on this matter – and that the dignity of the victim greatly limits the possibility for mercy in sentencing.

Keywords

Moral Judgment Moral Agent Crime Warrant Moral Belief Mandatory Sentence 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

References

  1. Braithwaite, J., and P. Pettit. 1990. Not just deserts. A republican theory of criminal justice. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  2. Byrd, S. 1989. Kant’s theory of punishment: Deterrence in its threat, retribution in its execution. Law and Philosophy 8: 151–200.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Carter, I. 1999. A measure of freedom. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Crocker, L. 1980. Positive liberty. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.Google Scholar
  5. Duff, R., and S. Marshall. 2006. How offensive can you get? . In Incivilities: Regulating offensive behaviour, eds. A. Von Hirsch and A. Simester, 57-90. Oxford: Hart Publishing.Google Scholar
  6. Dworkin, G. 1988. The theory and practice of autonomy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  7. Feinberg, J. 1970. The nature and value of rights. Journal of Value Inquiry 4: 243–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Feinberg, J. 1984. Harm to others. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  9. Friedman, M. 2008. Pettit’s civic republicanism and male domination. In Republicanism and political theory, eds. C. Laborde and J. Maynor, 246–68. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.Google Scholar
  10. Goodin, R. 2003. Folie républicaine. Annual Review of Political Science 6: 55–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Hill, T. 2000. Respect, pluralism and justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Husak, D. 2006. Disgust: Metaphysical and empirical speculations. In Incivilities: Regulating offensive behaviour, eds. A. Von Hirsch and A. Simester, 91–114. Oxford: Hart Publishing.Google Scholar
  13. Merle, J. 2000. A kantian critique of kant’s theory of punishment. Law and Philosophy 19: 311–38.Google Scholar
  14. Murphy, J., and J. Hampton. 1988. Forgiveness and mercy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Peijnenburg, J. 2007. Regret and retroaction. Homo Oeconomicus 24: 295–313.Google Scholar
  16. Pettit, P. 1996. Freedom as antipower. Ethics 106: 576–604.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Pettit, P. 1997. Republicanism: A theory of freedom and government. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  18. Pettit, P. 2001a. Capability and freedom: A defence of sen. Economics and Philosophy 17: 1–20.Google Scholar
  19. Pettit, P. 2001b. A theory of freedom: From the psychology to the politics of agency. Cambridge: Polity Press.Google Scholar
  20. Pettit, P. 2002. Keeping republicanism simple: On a difference with quentin skinner. Political Theory 30: 339–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. Pettit, P. 2008. Republican freedom: Three axioms, four theorems. In Republicanism and political theory, eds. C. Laborde and J. Maynor, 102–30. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.Google Scholar
  22. Rawls, J. 1971/1999. A theory of justice.. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  23. Raz, J. 1986. The morality of freedom. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
  24. Roberts, P. 2006. Penal offence in question: Some reference points for interdisciplinary conversation. In Incivilities: Regulating offensive behaviour, eds. A. Von Hirsch and A. Simester, 1–56. Oxford: Hart Publishing.Google Scholar
  25. Skinner, Q. 1998. Liberty before liberalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  26. Skinner, Q. 2008. Freedom as the absence of arbitrary power. In Republicanism and political theory, eds. C. Laborde and J. Maynor, 83-101. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.Google Scholar
  27. Slote, M. 1993. Virtue ethics and democratic values. Journal of Social Philosophy 24: 5–38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. Taylor, C. 2006. What’s wrong with negative liberty? . In Contemporary political philosophy; an anthology, eds. R. Goodin and P. Pettit, 387-97. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.Google Scholar
  29. Skinner, Q. 2006. A third concept of liberty. In Contemporary political philosophy; an anthology, eds. R. Goodin and P. Pettit, 398–415. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.Google Scholar
  30. Pettit, P. 2007. A republican right to basic income? Basic Income Studies 2: 1–8.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of AmsterdamAmsterdamThe Netherlands

Personalised recommendations