Husserl’s Concept of Pure Logical Grammar
Husserl raises the following problem: once the difference between dependent and independent meanings is reduced to the difference between dependent and independent objects, it is a question—for the dependent objects—of a law of essence governing their need for completion; consequently, meanings are subordinated to a priori laws determining their combination into new meanings (Husserl, 1984, B 317). Since all combinations of meanings presuppose a form of composition—that is to say, a dependent meaning—then, the very passage to a new meaning is subordinated to an a priori law. For example, “X and ... ” can be completed by Y—“X” and “Y” refer to nominal categories—, but not by “and” or “or”, without being nonsense: “X and and”, “X and or”.
KeywordsLinguistic Form Semantic Congruity Syntactical Form Ideal Framework Pure Logic
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- Husserl, E. (1964). Erfahrung und Urteil. Hamburg: Claassen. Husserl, E. (1968). Logische Untersuchungen, Vol. 1. Tübingen: Niemeyer.Google Scholar
- Husserl, E. (1974). Formale und transzendentale Logik. The Hague: Nijhoff.Google Scholar
- Husserl, E. (1979). Aufsätze und Rezensionen (1890–1910),(Hua XXII), The Hague: Nijhoff. (Translated by Dallas Willard: Edmund Husserl, Early Logical Writings in the Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics,Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994.)Google Scholar
- Bar-Hillel, Y. (1957). “Husserl’s Conception of a Purely Logical Grammar”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, March, 362–69.Google Scholar
- Blanché, R. (1970). L’axiomatique. Paris: PUF.Google Scholar
- Mohanty, J. N. (1969). Edmund Husserl’s Theory of Meaning. The Hague: Nijhoff.Google Scholar
- Ryle, G. (1971). “Phenomenology and Linguistic Analysis”, Neue Hefte für Philosophie: Phänomenologie und Sprachanalyse 1, 3–11.Google Scholar
- Wittgenstein, L. (1958). Philosophical Investigations. New York: Macmillan.Google Scholar