Towards a Logical Analysis of Adjusted Winner

  • Eric PacuitEmail author
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 352)


It is often convenient to view a computational procedure, or a program, as a relation on a set of states, where a state can be thought of as a function that assigns a value to every possible variable and a truth value to all propositions. This idea was proposed by Pratt [19] and extends the work of of Floyd [4] and Hoare [6]. Harel, Kozen and Tiuryn [5] provide a very thorough discussion of computational procedures from this point of view. In [12], Rohit Parikh suggests that a similar framework can be developed for studying social procedures, such as fair division algorithms or voting protocols.


Nash Equilibrium Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Strategy Profile Social Choice Theory Intended Interpretation 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Tilburg University, Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of ScienceTilburgThe Netherlands

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