Games in strategic form

  • Stef Tijs
Part of the Texts and Readings in Mathematics book series

Abstract

A p-person game in strategic form with player (decision maker) set P = {1, 2,…, p} can be described by an ordered 2p-tuple
$$\left\langle {{X_1},{X_2}, \ldots ,{X_p},{K_1},{K_2}, \ldots ,{K_p}} \right\rangle $$
where X i is the non-empty strategy set of player iP and K i : Π i=1 p X i → ℝ is the payoff function of player i, which assigns to each p-tuple x = (x1, x2,…, x p ) of strategies a real number K i (x). A play of such a game proceeds as follows. Eventually after pre-play communication, where no binding agreements can be made, each player i chooses independently of the other players one of his possible strategies, say x i . Then player 1 obtains a payoff K1(x1, x2,…,x p ),…, and player p a payoff K p (x1, x2,…,xp). The p-tuple (x1, x2,…, x p ) is called the outcome of the play.

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Copyright information

© Hindustan Book Agency 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Stef Tijs
    • 1
  1. 1.Tilburg UniversityTilburgNetherlands

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