Appearance, Thing-in-Itself, and the Problem of the Skeptical Hypothesis

Chapter
Part of the The New Synthese Historical Library book series (SYNL, volume 66)

Abstract

The recent debate on skepticism has devoted much attention to the question of whether or not the problem of skepticism is an intuitive one. An intuitive problem can be described as one that (a) occurs automatically as soon as we start to reflecting upon certain concepts, ideas or theories, and (b) is plausible insofar as it does not seem to presuppose a great deal of theoretical reasoning. If skepticism were an intuitive problem, there would be no chance to overcome philosophical doubt. For in this case we would automatically be confronted with skepticism as soon as we start to reflect upon the possibility of knowledge, such that philosophical doubt is plausible insofar as we are able to understand it without presupposing the whole theoretical background the problem may involve.

Keywords

External Object Empirical Realism External Reality Skeptical Hypothesis Transcendental Idealism 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Abbreviations

ED

Empirical Dualism

TD

Transcendental Dualism

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy, Faculty of HumanitiesUniversity of LuxembourgWalferdangeLuxembourg

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