Changing the Scientific Corpus

Chapter
Part of the Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science book series (LEUS, volume 21)

Abstract

There is a straightforward connection in terms of subject-matter between belief revision and one of the major issues in the philosophy of science, namely the dynamics of changes in scientific knowledge. But in spite of this connection, there has been relatively little contact between the two disciplines. There is an obvious reason for this lack of contact: The standard framework that is used in the belief change literature is not suitable for analyzing the mechanisms of change in science. The aim of this contribution is to identify the differences and show what modifications are needed to make the format suitable for modelling the development of scientific knowledge.

Keywords

Belief Revision Belief State Scientific Corpus Scientific Change Path Independence 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Division of PhilosophyRoyal Institute of TechnologyStockholmSweden

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