Levinas on Rationality and Representation

Abstract

This chapter sketches a picture of Levinas’s philosophy, with a view on his contribution to discussions on the problems associated with rationality and representational thought. He always approached these problems from the perspective of “loss of meaning” which he works out within the framework of two significant and complementary themes: that of the il-y-a and of hypostasis. The il-y-a is understood as a frightening, anonymous being in which man can feel lost. Hypostasis is understood as the genesis of the subject that wants to wrest itself from the grip of the il-y-a. The hypostasis leads to the development of the rational faculties of man, often referred to by Levinas as the ability to represent things. At this stage the escape from the il-y-a appears to be only partially successful: it keeps returning into the heart of the rationalist universe in veiled ways. This failure of rationality manifests itself as prejudice, meaninglessness and monotony. Searching for ways to overcome this loss of meaning Levinas to some extent follows Heidegger, who finds meaning in the horizons, the situating of life. At the same time Levinas states that this derivation of meaning is insufficient to fully counterbalance the misleading nature of representation. The deadlock can only be broken by the intervention of the Other – needy, indiscrete, sad –, who does not fit into my rationally organized order. The Other unmasks that order as being egological and imperious and causes me to feel ashamed. But as such he embodies the possibility of a new beginning, of improved rationality, and therewith: of change.