Chance and Necessity

From Humean Supervenience to Humean Projection
  • Wolfgang SpohnEmail author
Part of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science book series (BSPS, volume 284)


Probability abounds in the natural and social sciences. Yet, science strives for objectivity. Scientists are not pleased when told that probability is just opinion and there is no more sense to it. They are prone to believe in objective probabilities or chances. This is an essay about how to understand them.


Actual World Ranking Function Objective Probability Reflection Principle Principal Principle 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.



I am most grateful to Ludwig Fahrbach and Jacob Rosenthal for thorough-going discussions of earlier drafts of this paper; it gained immensely thereby.


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Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of KonstanzKonstanzGermany

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