Whence Ontological Structural Realism?

  • Juha Saatsi


I scrutinize (a) the alleged dichotomy between epistemic and ontological forms of structural realism, and (b) the considerations used to motivate the ontic variety over the epistemic. I argue that there’s nothing in the traditional realism debate that calls for ontological structural realism.


Structural Realism Quantum Particle Spacetime Point Pessimistic Induction Standard Realism 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.



I wish to thank Steven French and Angelo Cei for helpful correspondence.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of LeedsLeedsUK

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