Whence Ontological Structural Realism?
I scrutinize (a) the alleged dichotomy between epistemic and ontological forms of structural realism, and (b) the considerations used to motivate the ontic variety over the epistemic. I argue that there’s nothing in the traditional realism debate that calls for ontological structural realism.
KeywordsStructural Realism Quantum Particle Spacetime Point Pessimistic Induction Standard Realism
I wish to thank Steven French and Angelo Cei for helpful correspondence.
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