Recursive Self-prediction in Self-control and Its Failure

  • George Ainslie
Chapter
Part of the Theory and Decision Library book series (TDLA, volume 42)

The combination of human foresight and the discounting of delayed events in a hyperbolic curve is all that is needed to explain the learning of higher mental processes from the bottom up. These processes are selected by delayed rewards insofar as they counteract the over-valuation of imminent rewards that is also predicted by hyperbolic discounting. For instance, these processes come to interpret repeated, similar choices as moves in an intertemporal bargaining game resembling an iterated prisoner's dilemma. Perception of current choices as test cases for cooperation in such a game recruits the extra motivation experienced as willpower. Lines seen as criteria for such tests may be experienced as beliefs rather than resolutions. The chance that shifts of self-prediction may cause radical swings of motivation makes choice unpredictable from just knowing the person's prior incentives, even by the person herself; the resulting introspective uncertainty is arguably the subjective basis of freedom of will. A similar kind of recursive self-prediction explains how surges of emotion or appetite can be occasioned by symbols that convey no information about the availability of external rewards.

Keywords

Conditioned Stimulus Personal Rule Hyperbolic Discount Current Choice High Mental Function 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • George Ainslie
    • 1
  1. 1.Research PsychiatristVeterans Affairs Medical CenterCoatesville

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