The Complex Loop of Norm Emergence: A Simulation Model

  • Giulia Andrighetto
  • Marco Campennì
  • Federico Cecconi
  • Rosaria Conte
Part of the Agent-Based Social Systems book series (ABSS, volume 7)

Abstract

In this paper the results of several agent-based simulations, aiming to test the effectiveness of norm recognition and the role of normative beliefs in norm emergence are presented and discussed. Rather than mere behavioral regularities, norms are here seen as behaviors spreading to the extent that and because the ­corresponding commands and beliefs do spread as well. More specifically, we will present simulations aimed to compare the behavior of a population of normative agents provided with a norm recognition module and a population of social conformers whose behavior is determined only by a rule of imitation. The results of these simulations show that under specific conditions, i.e. moving from one social setting to another, imitators are not able to converge in a stable way on one single behavior; vice-versa, normative agents (equipped with the norm recognition module) are able to converge on one single behavior.

Keywords

Norm emergence Norm immergence Normative architecture Norm recognition Agent based social simulation 

Notes

Acknowledgments

This work was supported by the EMIL project (IST-033841), funded by the Future and Emerging Technologies program of the European Commission, in the framework of the initiative Simulating Emergent Properties in Complex Systems.

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Copyright information

© Springer 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Giulia Andrighetto
    • 1
  • Marco Campennì
    • 1
  • Federico Cecconi
    • 1
  • Rosaria Conte
    • 1
  1. 1.LABSS, Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione, CNRRomeItaly

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