A Model of Mental Model Formation in a Social Context
This paper presents a model of learning in a context of a relatively large population interacting through random bilateral matching to play a bilateral game in strategic form. While the theory of learning in games commonly assumes that the players can observe only the strategies chosen by their opponents, in this paper is introduced the additional assumption that the players are characterized by phenotypic traits observable by the other players with whom they interact. The extension of the traditional framework allows to introduce a more sophisticated and cognitively plausible expectations’ formation model than the ones proposed so far. In particular, this paper introduces a new model of the induction process through which the agents build mental models that take the form of lexicographically structured decision trees.
KeywordsTheory of Learning in Games Categorization, Social Stereotyping Fast and Frugal Heuristic Theory Self-Organization Data Mining
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