Sequential bargaining on a perishable goods market: An agents-based Model
Bilateral Sequential Bargaining has been extensively researched, for instance in game theory (Osborne and Rubinstein 1990, 1994, Muthoo 1999). The assumptions given in these models are quite far from the reality. In this paper we focus on an empirical market and try to find a model based on assumptions as close as possible to the reality. More precisely, we are interested in the (French) Fruit and Vegetable Market of National Interest in France.
KeywordsStylize Fact Reservation Price Expected Profit Transaction Price Initial Belief
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