Scaling properties of Two-sided Matching with Compromise

  • Tomoko Fuku
  • Akira Namatame
Conference paper
Part of the Agent-Based Social Systems book series (ABSS, volume 3)


In this paper, we propose a new algorithm for two-sided matching problems with some compromise. It is an important issue such as how far agents seek their own interest in a competitive environment? There are overwhelming evidences that support peoples are also motivated by concerns for fairness and reciprocity. We showed that compromise, an individually irrational behavior, improves the welfare of others. We also obtain large-scale properties of some two-sided matching algorithms. We show some compromises of individuals increase global welfare. The optimal compromise level is designed so that the social utility is maximized.


Stable Match Social Utility Assignment Game Preference List Utility Distribution 
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Copyright information

© Springer 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Tomoko Fuku
    • 1
  • Akira Namatame
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceNational Defense AcademyYokosukaJapan

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