Formation of Families

Chapter
Part of the Advances in Japanese Business and Economics book series (AJBE, volume 16)

Abstract

We consider issues of family formations. From a biological viewpoint, the ultimate goal of human beings can be viewed as raising children who possess the same gene. Only the genes that successfully achieved this goal survived. Although we may not view it as the goal of our life, it is important to understand how such a biological goal has been pursued by human beings.

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Copyright information

© Springer Japan KK 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of International and Public PolicyHitotsubashi UniversityKunitachiJapan

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