Approval Theory and Social Contract

  • Kiichiro YagiEmail author
Part of the Evolutionary Economics and Social Complexity Science book series (EESCS, volume 20)


This chapter’s basic theme is that of social philosophy: how is order in human society possible and what is the structure of its order? Naturally, the structure of social order relates to ethical problems in rules and duties. The author begins with a dispute over property and civil society in which he was involved in his twenties and sketches his scheme of mutual “approval” on property and ownership. He distinguishes the autonomous type and the synchronous (conformist) type of approval and follows the development of the relationships of both to the emergence of law and general economic media. Then, he applies the framework to the problematique of social contracts to determine its modern validity. He analyzes the structure of deontological ethics of Jürgen Habermas and Immanuel Kant from the perspective of approval theory.


Social order Approval theory Social contract Property and ownership Norm and interest Discourse ethics 


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Copyright information

© Springer Japan KK, part of Springer Nature 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Setsunan UniversityNeyagawaJapan

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