Complexity Cost and Two Types of Noise in the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
This study seeks to understand the effect of complexity cost and two types of transmission noise on equilibrium selection in populations of finite automata playing the repeated prisoner’s dilemma. Results indicate that noise and complexity cost have a harmful effect on the types of conditionally co-operative strategies essential for the emergence of co-operative behaviour in the population. In contrast, the unconditionally defecting strategy responsible for the dominance of mutual defection is relatively unharmed under these conditions.
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