Who will own outer space? governance over space resources in the age of human space exploration

  • Kurt Mills
Part of the Studies in Space Policy book series (STUDSPACE, volume 5)


Questions of ownership and control are key issues in international relations and international law. They have been addressed to a certain extent in the context of outer space. However, as humanity expands into space it will become obvious that there are still many unanswered questions regarding who should control the vast resources of space.


Celestial Body International Space Station European Space Agency Outer Space Geostationary Orbit 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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  • Kurt Mills

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