Advertisement

Towards Everlasting Privacy and Efficient Coercion Resistance in Remote Electronic Voting

  • Panagiotis GrontasEmail author
  • Aris Pagourtzis
  • Alexandros Zacharakis
  • Bingsheng Zhang
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10958)

Abstract

In this work, we propose a first version of an e-voting scheme that achieves end-to-end verifiability, everlasting privacy and efficient coercion resistance in the JCJ setting. Everlasting privacy is achieved assuming an anonymous channel, without resorting to dedicated channels between the election authorities to exchange private data. In addition, the proposed scheme achieves coercion resistance under standard JCJ assumptions. As a core building block of our scheme, we also propose a new primitive called publicly auditable conditional blind signature (PACBS), where a client receives a token from the signing server after interaction; the token is a valid signature only if a certain condition holds and the validity of the signature can only be checked by a designated verifier. We utilize this primitive to blindly mark votes under coercion in an auditable manner.

Keywords

Electronic voting End-to-end verifiability Coercion resistance Everlasting privacy Publicly auditable conditional blind signatures 

Notes

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Peter Browne Roenne and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.

Supplementary material

References

  1. 1.
    Chaum, D.: Blind signatures for untraceable payments. In: Chaum, D., Rivest, R.L., Sherman, A.T. (eds.) Advances in Cryptology, pp. 199–203. Springer, Boston (1983).  https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-0602-4_18CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. 2.
    Fiat, A., Shamir, A.: How to prove yourself: practical solutions to identification and signature problems. In: Odlyzko, A.M. (ed.) CRYPTO 1986. LNCS, vol. 263, pp. 186–194. Springer, Heidelberg (1987).  https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-47721-7_12CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. 3.
    Schnorr, C.P.: Efficient identification and signatures for smart cards. In: Brassard, G. (ed.) CRYPTO 1989. LNCS, vol. 435, pp. 239–252. Springer, New York (1990).  https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-34805-0_22CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. 4.
    Fujioka, A., Okamoto, T., Ohta, K.: A practical secret voting scheme for large scale elections. In: Seberry, J., Zheng, Y. (eds.) AUSCRYPT 1992. LNCS, vol. 718, pp. 244–251. Springer, Heidelberg (1993).  https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-57220-1_66CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. 5.
    Okamoto, T.: Provably secure and practical identification schemes and corresponding signature schemes. In: Brickell, E.F. (ed.) CRYPTO 1992. LNCS, vol. 740, pp. 31–53. Springer, Heidelberg (1993).  https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48071-4_3CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. 6.
    Chaum, D., Pedersen, T.P.: Wallet databases with observers. In: Brickell, E.F. (ed.) CRYPTO 1992. LNCS, vol. 740, pp. 89–105. Springer, Heidelberg (1993).  https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48071-4_7CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. 7.
    Cramer, R., Damgård, I., Schoenmakers, B.: Proofs of partial knowledge and simplified design of witness hiding protocols. In: Desmedt, Y.G. (ed.) CRYPTO 1994. LNCS, vol. 839, pp. 174–187. Springer, Heidelberg (1994).  https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48658-5_19CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. 8.
    Jakobsson, M., Sako, K., Impagliazzo, R.: Designated verifier proofs and their applications. In: Maurer, U. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1996. LNCS, vol. 1070, pp. 143–154. Springer, Heidelberg (1996).  https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-68339-9_13CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. 9.
    Juels, A., Luby, M., Ostrovsky, R.: Security of blind digital signatures. In: Kaliski, B.S. (ed.) CRYPTO 1997. LNCS, vol. 1294, pp. 150–164. Springer, Heidelberg (1997).  https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0052233CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. 10.
    Ohkubo, M., Miura, F., Abe, M., Fujioka, A., Okamoto, T.: An improvement on a practical secret voting scheme. ISW 1999. LNCS, vol. 1729, pp. 225–234. Springer, Heidelberg (1999).  https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-47790-X_19CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. 11.
    Jakobsson, M., Juels, A.: Mix and match: secure function evaluation via ciphertexts. In: Okamoto, T. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2000. LNCS, vol. 1976, pp. 162–177. Springer, Heidelberg (2000).  https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44448-3_13CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. 12.
    Juels, A., Catalano, D., Jakobsson, M.: Coercion-resistant electronic elections. In: Proceedings of the 2005 ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society, pp. 61–70. ACM (2005)Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    Smith, W.D.: New cryptographic voting scheme with best-known theoretical properties. In: Frontiers in Electronic Elections (FEE 2005), June 2005Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    Benaloh, J.: Simple verifiable elections. In: EVT 2006 (2006)Google Scholar
  15. 15.
    Moran, T., Naor, M.: Receipt-free universally-verifiable voting with everlasting privacy. In: Dwork, C. (ed.) CRYPTO 2006. LNCS, vol. 4117, pp. 373–392. Springer, Heidelberg (2006).  https://doi.org/10.1007/11818175_22CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. 16.
    Araújo, R., Foulle, S., Traoré, J.: A practical and secure coercion resistant scheme for remote elections. In: Frontiers of Electronic Voting (2007)Google Scholar
  17. 17.
    Weber, S.G., Araujo, R., Buchmann, J.: On coercion-resistant electronic elections with linear work. In: ARES, pp. 908–916. IEEE (2007)Google Scholar
  18. 18.
    Adida, B.: Helios: web-based open-audit voting. In: Proceedings of the 17th Conference on Security Symposium, pp. 335–348. USENIX Association (2008)Google Scholar
  19. 19.
    Clarkson, M.R., Chong, S., Myers, A.C.: Civitas: toward a secure voting system. In: IEEE Security and Privacy Symposium (2008)Google Scholar
  20. 20.
    Araújo, R., Ben Rajeb, N., Robbana, R., Traoré, J., Youssfi, S.: Towards practical and secure coercion-resistant electronic elections. In: Heng, S.-H., Wright, R.N., Goi, B.-M. (eds.) CANS 2010. LNCS, vol. 6467, pp. 278–297. Springer, Heidelberg (2010).  https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17619-7_20CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. 21.
    Moran, T., Naor, M.: Split-ballot voting: everlasting privacy with distributed trust. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur. 13(2), 16 (2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. 22.
    Koenig, R., Haenni, R., Fischli, S.: Preventing board flooding attacks in coercion-resistant electronic voting schemes. In: Camenisch, J., Fischer-Hübner, S., Murayama, Y., Portmann, A., Rieder, C. (eds.) SEC 2011. IAICT, vol. 354, pp. 116–127. Springer, Heidelberg (2011).  https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-21424-0_10CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. 23.
    Schläpfer, M., Haenni, R., Koenig, R., Spycher, O.: Efficient vote authorization in coercion-resistant internet voting. In: Kiayias, A., Lipmaa, H. (eds.) Vote-ID 2011. LNCS, vol. 7187, pp. 71–88. Springer, Heidelberg (2012).  https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32747-6_5CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. 24.
    Schröder, D., Unruh, D.: Security of blind signatures revisited. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, p. 316 (2011)Google Scholar
  25. 25.
    Bayer, S., Groth, J.: Efficient zero-knowledge argument for correctness of a shuffle. In: Pointcheval, D., Johansson, T. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2012. LNCS, vol. 7237, pp. 263–280. Springer, Heidelberg (2012).  https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_17CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. 26.
    Spycher, O., Koenig, R., Haenni, R., Schläpfer, M.: A new approach towards coercion-resistant remote E-voting in linear time. In: Danezis, G. (ed.) FC 2011. LNCS, vol. 7035, pp. 182–189. Springer, Heidelberg (2012).  https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27576-0_15CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. 27.
    Clark, J., Hengartner, U.: Selections: internet voting with over-the-shoulder coercion-resistance. In: Danezis, G. (ed.) FC 2011. LNCS, vol. 7035, pp. 47–61. Springer, Heidelberg (2012).  https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27576-0_4CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. 28.
    Arapinis, M., Cortier, V., Kremer, S., Ryan, M.: Practical everlasting privacy. In: Basin, D., Mitchell, J.C. (eds.) POST 2013. LNCS, vol. 7796, pp. 21–40. Springer, Heidelberg (2013).  https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-36830-1_2CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  29. 29.
    Araújo, R., Traoré, J.: A practical coercion resistant voting scheme revisited. In: Heather, J., Schneider, S., Teague, V. (eds.) Vote-ID 2013. LNCS, vol. 7985, pp. 193–209. Springer, Heidelberg (2013).  https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-39185-9_12CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. 30.
    Buchmann, J., Demirel, D., van de Graaf, J.: Towards a publicly-verifiable mix-net providing everlasting privacy. In: Sadeghi, A.-R. (ed.) FC 2013. LNCS, vol. 7859, pp. 197–204. Springer, Heidelberg (2013).  https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-39884-1_16CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  31. 31.
    Cuvelier, É., Pereira, O., Peters, T.: Election verifiability or ballot privacy: do we need to choose? In: Crampton, J., Jajodia, S., Mayes, K. (eds.) ESORICS 2013. LNCS, vol. 8134, pp. 481–498. Springer, Heidelberg (2013).  https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40203-6_27CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  32. 32.
    Grewal, G.S., Ryan, M.D., Bursuc, S., Ryan, P.Y.A.: Caveat coercitor: coercion-evidence in electronic voting. In: IEEE Security and Privacy Symposium. IEEE (2013)Google Scholar
  33. 33.
    Kiayias, A., Zacharias, T., Zhang, B.: End-to-end verifiable elections in the standard model. In: Oswald, E., Fischlin, M. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2015. LNCS, vol. 9057, pp. 468–498. Springer, Heidelberg (2015).  https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46803-6_16CrossRefzbMATHGoogle Scholar
  34. 34.
    Araújo, R., Barki, A., Brunet, S., Traoré, J.: Remote electronic voting can be efficient, verifiable and coercion-resistant. In: Clark, J., Meiklejohn, S., Ryan, P.Y.A., Wallach, D., Brenner, M., Rohloff, K. (eds.) FC 2016. LNCS, vol. 9604, pp. 224–232. Springer, Heidelberg (2016).  https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53357-4_15CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  35. 35.
    Cortier, V., Galindo, D., Kuesters, R., Mueller, J., Truderung, T.: SoK: verifiability notions for e-voting protocols. In: IEEE Security and Privacy Symposium, pp. 779–798 (2016)Google Scholar
  36. 36.
    Locher, P., Haenni, R., Koenig, R.E.: Coercion-resistant internet voting with everlasting privacy. In: Clark, J., Meiklejohn, S., Ryan, P.Y.A., Wallach, D., Brenner, M., Rohloff, K. (eds.) FC 2016. LNCS, vol. 9604, pp. 161–175. Springer, Heidelberg (2016).  https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53357-4_11CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  37. 37.
    Ryan, P.Y.A., Rønne, P.B., Iovino, V.: Selene: voting with transparent verifiability and coercion-mitigation. In: Clark, J., Meiklejohn, S., Ryan, P.Y.A., Wallach, D., Brenner, M., Rohloff, K. (eds.) FC 2016. LNCS, vol. 9604, pp. 176–192. Springer, Heidelberg (2016).  https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53357-4_12CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  38. 38.
    Grontas, P., Pagourtzis, A., Zacharakis, A.: Coercion resistance in a practical secret voting scheme for large scale elections. In: ISPAN-FCST-ISCC 2017, pp. 514–519 (2017)Google Scholar
  39. 39.
    Iovino, V., Rial, A., Rønne, P.B., Ryan, P.Y.A.: Using selene to verify your vote in JCJ. In: Brenner, M., et al. (eds.) FC 2017. LNCS, vol. 10323, pp. 385–403. Springer, Cham (2017).  https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70278-0_24CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  40. 40.
    Yang, N., Clark, J.: Practical governmental voting with unconditional integrity and privacy. In: Brenner, M., et al. (eds.) FC 2017. LNCS, vol. 10323, pp. 434–449. Springer, Cham (2017).  https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70278-0_27CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  41. 41.
    Zacharakis, A., Grontas, P., Pagourtzis, A.: Conditional blind signatures. In: 7th International Conference on Algebraic Informatics (Short Version) (2017). http://eprint.iacr.org/2017/682

Copyright information

© International Financial Cryptography Association 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Panagiotis Grontas
    • 1
    Email author
  • Aris Pagourtzis
    • 1
  • Alexandros Zacharakis
    • 1
  • Bingsheng Zhang
    • 2
  1. 1.School of Electrical and Computer EngineeringNational Technical University of AthensAthensGreece
  2. 2.School of Computing and CommunicationsLancaster UniversityBailriggUK

Personalised recommendations