The Effect of Brexit on the Balance of Power in the European Union Council Revisited: A Fuzzy Multicriteria Attempt
The approaching exit of Great Britain from the European Union raises many questions about the changing relations between other member states. In this work, we propose a new fuzzy game for multicriteria voting. We use this game to show changes in Shapley’s values in a situation where the weights of individual member countries are not determined and we describe non-determinism with fuzzy sets. In particular, this concerns considerations related to pre-coalitions.
KeywordsVoting games Power index Fuzzy set European Union Council
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