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Urteilen und Entscheiden im Sport

  • Geoffrey SchweizerEmail author
  • Henning Plessner
Chapter

Zusammenfassung

Psychologische Theorien erklären Urteile und Entscheidungen und spezifizieren die ihnen zugrundeliegenden Prozesse. So können Urteile und Entscheidungen viele oder wenige Informationen berücksichtigen, schnell oder langsam sein und auf bewusstem Nachdenken oder auf Routinen beruhen. Verschiedene Faktoren können unerwünschte Einflüsse auf Urteile und Entscheidungen ausüben. Dazu gehören Vorwissen, Zuschauerlärm und die Urteile und Entscheidungen anderer. So legen sportpsychologische Studien nahe, dass frühere Entscheidungen von Unparteiischen spätere Entscheidungen beeinflussen, dass Unparteiische strenger urteilen, wenn Zuschauer und Zuschauerinnen lauter sind und dass Mitglieder von Kampfgerichten sich von den Urteilen der anderen Mitglieder beeinflussen lassen. Urteile und Entscheidungen im Sport können durch Interventionen verbessert werden. Dazu ist ein grundlagenwissenschaftliches Verständnis des jeweiligen Urteils- oder Entscheidungsvorgangs hilfreich.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Deutschland, ein Teil von Springer Nature 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institut für Sport und SportwissenschaftRuprecht-Karls-Universität HeidelbergHeidelbergDeutschland

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