Rational Coordination with no Communication or Conventions
We study pure coordination games where in every outcome, all players have identical payoffs, ‘win’ or ‘lose’. We identify and discuss a range of ‘purely rational principles’ guiding the reasoning of rational players in such games and analyse which classes of coordination games can be solved by such players with no preplay communication or conventions. We observe that it is highly nontrivial to delineate a boundary between purely rational principles and other decision methods, such as conventions, for solving such coordination games.
The work of Valentin Goranko was partly supported by a research grant 2015-04388 of the Swedish Research Council. The work of Antti Kuusisto was supported by the ERC grant 647289 “CODA.” We thank the reviewers of this paper, as well as those of the Strategic Reasoning 2017 abstract for valuable remarks.
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