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B Stand der Forschung

  • Ulrich Frey
Chapter

Zusammenfassung

Dieses Kapitel erörtert den Stand der Forschung für die drei zentralen zugrunde liegenden Gebiete dieser Arbeit: die allgemeine Struktur von Kooperationsmechanismen in der Biologie, die spieltheoretische Kooperationsforschung für soziale Dilemmata bei Gemeingütern und die Analyse sozial-ökologischer Systeme, insbesondere möglicher Erfolgsfaktoren.

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© Springer-Verlag GmbH Deutschland 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ulrich Frey
    • 1
  1. 1.Technische ThermodynamikDeutsches Zentrum für Luft- und RaumfahrtStuttgartDeutschland

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