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Model Checking Exact Cost for Attack Scenarios

  • Zaruhi AslanyanEmail author
  • Flemming Nielson
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10204)

Abstract

Attack trees constitute a powerful tool for modelling security threats. Many security analyses of attack trees can be seamlessly expressed as model checking of Markov Decision Processes obtained from the attack trees, thus reaping the benefits of a coherent framework and a mature tool support. However, current model checking does not encompass the exact cost analysis of an attack, which is standard for attack trees.

Our first contribution is the logic erPCTL with cost-related operators. The extended logic allows to analyse the probability of an event satisfying given cost bounds and to compute the exact cost of an event. Our second contribution is the model checking algorithm for erPCTL. Finally, we apply our framework to the analysis of attack trees.

Keywords

Attack trees Markov Decision Processes Probabilistic model checking Probabilistic temporal logic 

Notes

Acknowledgment

Part of the research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement no. 318003 (TRE\(_\mathrm {S}\)PASS). Special thanks also go to Roberto Vigo for valuable comments.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.DTU ComputeTechnical University of DenmarkKongens LyngbyDenmark

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