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Chosen-Ciphertext Secure Fully Homomorphic Encryption

  • Ran Canetti
  • Srinivasan Raghuraman
  • Silas RichelsonEmail author
  • Vinod Vaikuntanathan
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10175)

Abstract

We give three fully homomoprhic encryption (FHE) schemes that are secure against non-adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA1). For the first two, we extend the generic transformation of Boneh, Canetti, Halevi and Katz to turn any multi-key identity-based FHE scheme into a CCA1-secure FHE scheme. We then show two instantiations of multi-key identity-based FHE: One from LWE in the random oracle model, and one from sub-exponentially secure indistinguishability obfuscation. Both constructions are compact with respect to the function evaluated homomorphically but not compact with respect to the number of ciphertext involved in the homomorphic evaluation. The third scheme uses succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge (SNARKs) and is fully compact.

Keywords

Encryption Scheme Homomorphic Encryption Random Oracle Model Challenge Ciphertext Reference String 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ran Canetti
    • 1
    • 3
  • Srinivasan Raghuraman
    • 2
  • Silas Richelson
    • 1
    • 2
    Email author
  • Vinod Vaikuntanathan
    • 2
  1. 1.Boston UniversityBostonUSA
  2. 2.MITCambridgeUSA
  3. 3.Tel-Aviv University & CPIISTel AvivIsrael

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