Better Two-Round Adaptive Multi-party Computation

  • Ran Canetti
  • Oxana Poburinnaya
  • Muthuramakrishnan Venkitasubramaniam
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10175)


The only known two-round multi-party computation protocol that withstands adaptive corruption of all parties is the ingenious protocol of Garg and Polychroniadou [TCC 15]. We present protocols that improve on the GP protocol in a number of ways. First, concentrating on the semi-honest case and taking a different approach than GP, we show a two-round, adaptively secure protocol where:
  • Only a global (i.e., non-programmable) reference string is needed. In contrast, in GP the reference string is programmable, even in the semi-honest case.

  • Only polynomially-secure indistinguishability obfuscation for circuits and injective one way functions are assumed. In GP, sub-exponentially secure IO is assumed.

Second, we show how to make the GP protocol have only RAM complexity, even for Byzantine corruptions. For this we construct the first statistically-sound non-interactive Zero-Knowledge scheme with RAM complexity.



We thank Justin Holmgren for pointing out that our MPC protocol can be used to compute a garbling scheme in [IK02] manner, which allows us to avoid the use of subexponentially-secure \(\mathsf {iO}\) even in the RAM setting.


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Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ran Canetti
    • 1
    • 2
  • Oxana Poburinnaya
    • 1
  • Muthuramakrishnan Venkitasubramaniam
    • 3
  1. 1.Boston UniversityBostonUSA
  2. 2.Tel Aviv University and CPIISTel AvivIsrael
  3. 3.University of RochesterRochesterUSA

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