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Correlated and Coarse Equilibria of Single-Item Auctions

  • Michal Feldman
  • Brendan LucierEmail author
  • Noam Nisan
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10123)

Abstract

We study correlated equilibria and coarse equilibria of simple first-price single-item auctions in the simplest auction model of full information. Nash equilibria are known to always yield full efficiency and a revenue that is at least the second-highest value. We prove that the same is true for all correlated equilibria, even those in which agents overbid – i.e., bid above their values.

Coarse equilibria, in contrast, may yield lower efficiency and revenue. We show that the revenue can be as low as \(26\%\) of the second-highest value in a coarse equilibrium, even if agents are assumed not to overbid, and this is tight. We also show that when players do not overbid, the worst-case bound on social welfare at coarse equilibrium improves from \(63\%\) of the highest value to \(81\%\), and this bound is tight as well.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Price Auction Correlate Equilibrium Pure Nash Equilibrium Bayesian Setting 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Tel Aviv UniversityTel AvivIsrael
  2. 2.Microsoft ResearchRedmondUSA
  3. 3.Hebrew UniversityJerusalemIsrael

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