On the Possibility of Non-interactive E-Voting in the Public-Key Setting

  • Rosario Giustolisi
  • Vincenzo Iovino
  • Peter B. Rønne
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9604)

Abstract

In 2010 Hao, Ryan and Zielinski proposed a simple decentralized e-voting protocol that only requires 2 rounds of communication. Thus, for k elections their protocol needs 2k rounds of communication. Observing that the first round of their protocol is aimed to establish the public-keys of the voters, we propose an extension of the protocol as a non-interactive e-voting scheme in the public-key setting (NIVS) in which the voters, after having published their public-keys, can use the corresponding secret-keys to participate in an arbitrary number of one-round elections.

We first construct a NIVS with a standard tally function where the number of votes for each candidate is counted.

Further, we present constructions for two alternative types of elections. Specifically in the first type (dead or alive elections) the tally shows if at least one voter cast a vote for the candidate. In the second one (elections by unanimity), the tally shows if all voters cast a vote for the candidate.

Our constructions are based on bilinear groups of prime order.

As definitional contribution we provide formal computational definitions for privacy and verifiability of NIVSs. We conclude by showing intriguing relations between our results, secure computation, electronic exams and conference management systems.

Keywords

E-voting Bilinear maps Secure computation Electronic exams Conference management systems 

Notes

Acknowledgments

Vincenzo Iovino is supported by the Fonds National de la Recherche, Luxembourg, and Peter B. Rønne is supported by the ANR project Sequoia ANR-14-CE28-0030-01. We thank Yu Li for useful comments and Qiang Tang for pointing out a generalization of our definition of dispute-freeness.

References

  1. [BF01]
    Boneh, D., Franklin, M.: Identity-based encryption from the weil pairing. In: Kilian, J. (ed.) CRYPTO 2001. LNCS, vol. 2139, pp. 213–229. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. [BFM88]
    Blum, M., Feldman, P., Micali, S.: Non-interactive zero-knowledge and its applications (extended abstract). In: 20th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pp. 103–112. ACM Press (1988)Google Scholar
  3. [BFW15]
    Bernhard, D., Fischlin, M., Warinschi, B.: Adaptive proofs of knowledge in the random oracle model. In: Katz, J. (ed.) PKC 2015. LNCS, vol. 9020, pp. 629–649. Springer, Heidelberg (2015)Google Scholar
  4. [BIPT11]
    Braghin, S., Iovino, V., Persiano, G., Trombetta, A.: Secure and policy-private resource sharing in an online social network. In: PASSAT/SocialCom 2011, Privacy, Security, Risk and Trust (PASSAT), 2011 IEEE Third International Conference on and 2011 IEEE Third International Conference on Social Computing (SocialCom), Boston, MA, USA, 9–11 October 2011, pp. 872–875 (2011)Google Scholar
  5. [Boy08]
    Boyen, X.: The uber-assumption family. In: Galbraith, S.D., Paterson, K.G. (eds.) Pairing 2008. LNCS, vol. 5209, pp. 39–56. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. [BR93]
    Bellare, M., Rogaway, P.: Random oracles are practical: a paradigm for designing efficient protocols. In: Ashby, V. (ed.) ACM CCS 93: 1st Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 62–73. ACM Press, November 1993Google Scholar
  7. [CDS94]
    Cramer, R., Damgård, I.B., Schoenmakers, B.: Proof of partial knowledge and simplified design of witness hiding protocols. In: Desmedt, Y.G. (ed.) CRYPTO 1994. LNCS, vol. 839, pp. 174–187. Springer, Heidelberg (1994)Google Scholar
  8. [CI11]
    De Caro, A., Iovino, V.: JPBC: Java pairing based cryptography. In: Proceedings of the 16th IEEE Symposium on Computers and Communications, ISCC 2011, Kerkyra, Corfu, Greece, June 28 - July 1, 2011, pp. 850–855 (2011)Google Scholar
  9. [DH76]
    Diffie, W., Hellman, M.E.: New directions in cryptography. IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 22(6), 644–654 (1976)MathSciNetCrossRefMATHGoogle Scholar
  10. [FLS90]
    Feige, U., Lapidot, D., Shamir, A.: Multiple non-interactive zero knowledge proofs based on a single random string (extended abstract). In: 31st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pp. 308–317. IEEE Computer Society Press, October 1990Google Scholar
  11. [FS87]
    Fiat, A., Shamir, A.: How to prove yourself: practical solutions to identification and signature problems. In: Odlyzko, A.M. (ed.) CRYPTO 1986. LNCS, vol. 263, pp. 186–194. Springer, Heidelberg (1987)Google Scholar
  12. [GGG+14]
    Goldwasser, S., Gordon, S.D., Goyal, V., Jain, A., Katz, J., Liu, F.-H., Sahai, A., Shi, E., Zhou, H.-S.: Multi-input functional encryption. In: Nguyen, P.Q., Oswald, E. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2014. LNCS, vol. 8441, pp. 578–602. Springer, Heidelberg (2014)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. [GGHR14]
    Garg, S., Gentry, C., Halevi, S., Raykova, M.: Two-round secure MPC from indistinguishability obfuscation. In: Lindell, Y. (ed.) TCC 2014. LNCS, vol. 8349, pp. 74–94. Springer, Heidelberg (2014)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. [GIR15]
    Giustolisi, R., Iovino, V., Rønne, P.B.: On the possibility of non-interactive e-voting in the public-key setting. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2015/1119 (2015). http://eprint.iacr.org/
  15. [Gol04]
    Goldreich, O.: Foundations of Cryptography: Basic Applications, vol. 2. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2004)CrossRefMATHGoogle Scholar
  16. [Hal]
    Halevi, S.: Web submission and review softwares. http://people.csail.mit.edu/shaih/websubrev/
  17. [HRZ10]
    Hao, F., Ryan, P.Y.A., Zielinski, P.: Anonymous voting by two-round public discussion. IET Inf. Secur. 4(2), 62–67 (2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. [IZ15]
    Iovino, V., Żebroski, K.: Simulation-based secure functional encryption in the random oracle model. In: Lauter, K., Rodríguez-Henríquez, F. (eds.) LatinCrypt 2015. LNCS, vol. 9230, pp. 21–39. Springer, Heidelberg (2015)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. [Jou04]
    Joux, A.: A one round protocol for tripartite Diffie-Hellman. J. Cryptol. 17(4), 263–276 (2004)MathSciNetCrossRefMATHGoogle Scholar
  20. [KSRH12]
    Khader, D., Smyth, B., Ryan, P.Y.A., Hao, F.: A fair and robust voting system by broadcast. In: 5th International Conference on Electronic Voting 201, (EVOTE 2012), Co-organized by the Council of Europe, Gesellschaft für Informatik and E-Voting.CC, July 11–14, 2012, Castle Hofen, Bregenz, Austria, pp. 285–299 (2012)Google Scholar
  21. [Lyn]
    Lynn, B.: Pairing-based cryptography library. https://crypto.stanford.edu/pbc/
  22. [MPR06]
    Micali, S., Pass, R., Rosen, A.: Input-indistinguishable computation. In: 47th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pp. 367–378. IEEE Computer Society Press, October 2006Google Scholar
  23. [Yao82]
    Yao, A.C.: Protocols for secure computations (extended abstract). In: 23rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pp. 160–164. IEEE Computer Society Press, November 1982Google Scholar

Copyright information

© International Financial Cryptography Association 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Rosario Giustolisi
    • 1
  • Vincenzo Iovino
    • 2
  • Peter B. Rønne
    • 2
    • 3
  1. 1.SICS Swedish ICTKistaSweden
  2. 2.University of LuxembourgLuxembourg CityLuxembourg
  3. 3.INRIA NancyVillers-lès-nancyFrance

Personalised recommendations